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Abstract: We contribute to the existing research about policy-induced technology adoption in several ways. 
First, we suggest a new survey design to measure the energy-related policy environment. Second, we 
simultaneously estimate the policy effects for the adoption propensity and the adoption intensity 
simultaneously and, third, we conduct an international comparison of the policy effects. Based on a 
representative sample of firms for Austria, Germany, and Switzerland we find that policies in all three countries 
essentially promote the adoption of technologies and they are practically ineffective for the intensity, which 
poses a great challenge to future policy designs. Voluntary agreements or demand related factors are among 
the most important drivers for the adoption propensity of green energy technologies. Given the current 
institutional framework in the surveyed countries, subsidies are more effective in Austria, taxes are more 
effective in Germany, and demand related factors are relatively more effective in Switzerland. 
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1. Introduction  
Despite the growing literature on the adoption of energy-efficient technologies and the well elaborated 
theoretical background on technology diffusion (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995, Battisti and Stoneman 2003, 
2005), gaps remain in the empirical literature limiting our understanding of the effects of policies on the 
adoption of energy-related technologies.  
First, current literature either focuses on the propensity of adoption (Veugelers 2012, Arvanitis and Ley 2013) 
or intensity of adoption (Stucki and Woerter 2016) rather than recognizing that the two activities have different 
features. Secondly, data availability seriously limits cross country comparisons depriving the possibility to 
identify policy effects based on identical definitions, an identical theoretical background, an identical model 
specification, considering country specific factors. With the paper at hand we address both issues. We 
simultaneously estimate the relationship between energy-related policies including voluntary measures and 
the propensity to adopt environmentally friendly energy technologies1 (inter-firm) and the effect of policies on 
the intensity of investments in such technologies (intra-firm). Based on a representative panel of firms for 
Switzerland, Germany, and Austria, respectively, we collected data for all three countries using a commonly 
designed questionnaire. The surveys have been conducted by KOF (Swiss Economics Institute; Switzerland), 
ZEW (The Centre for European Economic Research, Germany), and WIFO (Austrian Institute of Economic 
Research, Austria). These are institutions with many years of experience in collecting survey data and the 
applied survey design has been frequently used to provide survey based information for official statistics in the 
respective countries.  
An important contribution to the existing literature also refers to the measurement of the energy-related policy 
environment. Ghisetti and Pontoni (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of policy effects on environmental 
innovation and found that the operationalization of the policy information is crucial for the result. Hence, we 
made a great effort to measure policies as exactly and unbiased as possible using surveys as a tool for collecting 
this information. We wanted to avoid the frequently observed issue that policy information is only available for 
firms that adopted green energy technologies and we also wanted to avoid a potentially “common method 
bias” by posing a question that contains the type of policy and its effect in one sentence.2 This led to a new 
design of the questionnaire where we excluded a direct link between the policy exposure and the adoption 
behavior of the firm. We asked firms to rate the importance of a series of energy-related factors, including 
government policies (taxes and levies, regulations, subsidies), voluntary agreements, demand related factors, 
and factors related to the energy environment (fluctuation of energy prices, (feared) bottlenecks in energy 
supply). Clearly, this question asks for a “subjective” response. The usual critic for this type of question (see 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) does not necessarily apply, however. First, the respondents usually think of 
an “objective” event in the firm or in its environment, or an important discussion that helps him/her to decide 
if a policy-related factor is important or not. Second, the list of policy-related factors helps the respondents to 
                                                                
1 Energy technologies that increase the energy efficiency or that use renewable energy sources. Such 
Technologies may include tangible equipment as well as information and management systems, In the 
remainder of the paper, we use the term ‚green energy technology’ to denote these technologies. 
2 For instance: „Did the firm introduce and environmentally friendly technology in response to regulation x?“   
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assess the relative importance among the factors asked; which is important for the applied econometric 
analysis.  
Based on a comprehensive data set—which allows for a rich control vector—covering the countries Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland, we apply standard econometric procedures to identify the relationship between 
different policies and the propensity to install green energy technologies. Moreover, we identify their meaning 
for the investment intensity in such technologies. We can identify country differences for both aspects of 
adoption (propensity/intensity) and we can compare the results across different countries. We also investigate 
if firm characteristics—like “energy intensity”—drives the adoption. In a more explorative investigation we 
analyze if policy effects differ across technologies and if their effect differs between technology adoption and 
the adoption of environmental management systems (non-technology measures). 
The direct comparisons of policy effectiveness for the propensity of adoption and the intensity of adoption, 
respectively, reveals some interesting insights. Policies in all three countries essentially promote the adoption 
of technologies and they are practically ineffective for the intensity, which poses a great challenge to future 
policy designs; the intensity of adoption is mainly driven by firm specific characteristics, like the energy costs of 
the focal firm and firm size. Only public subsidies show a significant and positive relationship with the 
investment intensity in green energy technologies. Voluntary agreements or demand related factors are among 
the most important drivers for the adoption of such technologies.  
Exploratory estimations on technology specific effects of the investigated factors reveal that demand related 
factors and public subsidies are important for the adoption of all identified technologies (excluding transport), 
whereas the adoption of green energy technologies in the field of production is significantly driven by taxes 
and in the field of buildings voluntary agreements are very important. The adoption of energy management 
systems is driven by taxes, voluntary agreements and public subsidies.  
In general, national promotion plans relying on subsidies and demand related factors appear to be effective for 
the adoption of a broad spectrum of technologies and green management systems. Taxes and voluntary 
agreements are also overall effective but they show some technology specific patterns, which can be due to 
the lack of initiatives related to such instruments. Given the current institutional framework in the respective 
countries, subsidies are more effective in Austria, taxes are more effective in Germany, and demand related 
factors are relatively more effective in Switzerland. 
The paper is structured like follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the policy environment in the investigated 
countries. Section 3 provides a review of the literature and identifies relevant hypotheses to be tested in the 
empirical part of the paper. Section 4 presents some important details about the survey design and the data 
description. Section 5 deals with the econometric framework applied to test the hypotheses. Section 6 presents 
the results and in section 7 we conclude and point at important policy implications.  
 
2. The policy environment in the specific countries  
Switzerland 
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Stucki and Woerter (2016) and Pellegrin and Woerter (2016) provide a brief description of the Swiss energy-
related policy framework. Switzerland has rather few policy measures to promote the adoption and generation 
of energy-related technologies compared to, e.g., Germany. The Swiss framework is characterized by market 
incentives and voluntary agreements and there are also some important targeted policies. As of today (2016) 
there is a CO2-tax (levy; since 2008)) that was part of the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol and a 
Swiss emission trading system (for heavy polluters)–which is still very narrow–started in 2013. The tax for CO2 
has increased over time and amounts to 85 CHF per CO2 ton in 2016. There is also an emission regulation for 
passenger cars–similar to the EU-regulations–which has been effective since 2012. A feed-in-tariff system has 
been already introduced in 1998 and a (subsidy) program for adoption of green technologies in the building 
sector, started in 2010. There are also regulations concerning labeling, promotion and installation of renewable 
energy plants. Public subsidies are available in form of a technology fund to promote innovative technologies 
that reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the consumption of resources. It also supports the use of renewable 
energy and an increase in energy efficiency. There are also subsidies for basic research and applied R&D in form 
of pilot plants for economical and efficient use of energy and use of renewable energies. Hence, all types of 
policy measures are used to promote the adoption/generation of environmentally friendly technologies in 
Switzerland (regulations, taxes, subsidies), however, 41% of Swiss firms bring some importance to the tax 
regime (11% high importance), 33% to regulation (9% high importance) and 27% to subsidies (7% high 
importance). Like assumed above, voluntary agreements and demand related factors are perceived as 
relatively more or of equal importance compared to the comparison countries Austria and Germany, 
respectively (see Arvanitis et al. 2016).   
Germany 
Energy policy in Germany has been characterized in the past 25 years by a strong focus on renewable energies 
(Lehr and Lutz 2016). Renewable energy sources, particularly biomass, solar and wind energy, are expected to 
substitute electric energy production from nuclear power which is to fade out by 2022 (. At the same time, a 
growing share of renewable energy sources should help reaching the ambitious low-carbon targets of the 
German government (-40% by 2020 as compared to the 1990 level, -80% by 2050; see BMWi 2012) (Lutz et al. 
2014, Pregger et al. 2013). The Federal Government has introduced a series of laws and regulations to 
stimulate the shift in energy sources towards renewable energy. In 1991, the Electricity Feed-in Act obliged 
electric utility companies to take electric energy from renewable sources at a guaranteed feed-in tariff from 
local and regional renewable energy producers. In 2000, the Act was succeeded by the Renewable Energy Act. 
The fixed feed-in tariff was set at a level that guaranteed profitable production and was reduced in regular 
intervals in order to stimulate efficiency improvements (Büsgen and Dürrschmidt 200). The additional costs for 
utility companies are passed on to consumers (both households and enterprises) through a special item 
(renewable energy surcharge) in the electricity bill (Nolden 2013). Energy-intensive industries as well as firms 
with substantial own electricity production are partly exempted from the surcharge. For producers of 
renewable energy technologies, the legislation provided them with a home market advantage and led to the 
emergence of an innovative industry (Cantner et al. 2016, Lauber and Jacobsson 2016, Yu et al. 2016, Welfens 
and Lutz, 2012). For electricity consuming firms, the renewable energy policy in Germany resulted in a constant 
5 
 
increase in electricity prices and provided an incentive to invest into own electricity producing facilities based 
on renewable energy (particularly photovoltaic energy and biomass) (Lehr et al. 2009, 2012, Lipp 2007, Frondel 
et al. 2010). The trend to increasing electricity prices has been reinforced by an ecological tax reform in 1999, 
including the introduction of a new electricity tax. In addition, the petroleum tax has been redesigned to 
provide more incentives for investment in energy-saving vehicles.  
Further energy-related policy measures include the CO2 Building Rehabilitation Programme which provided 
incentives for energy-efficient building refurbishment (Rosenow 2013). The program is regarded as highly 
effective, having incentivized innovation both for building technology producers and house owners, including 
firms (Schroeder et al. 2011, Kuckshinrichs et al. 2010, Kronenberg et al. 2012, Galvin 2012). The German 
Federal Government is also running several R&D programs that foster the development of energy-saving 
technologies, The Federal Government’s 6th Energy Research Programme (2011-2016) focuses on energy 
saving and energy efficiency, wind energy, photovoltaic, solar technology, bio-energy, and nuclear fusion. The 
annual volume of R&D funding through this program -which targets both firms and public research 
organizations- is more than 0.8 billion € (BMWi 2016). There are no large-scale voluntary agreements on 
energy saving or energy efficiency on a cross-industry level in Germany, though individual industries such as the 
chemical industry or the automotive have been following such an approach. 
Austria 
Energy always ranked high on the Austrian policy agenda for at least three reasons. First, energy intensive 
sectors have a long history (e.g., metal producing and processing, cellulose and paper) and relatively high share 
in manufacturing production. This relates to the second point of a particularly high share of renewable energy 
from hydraulic power, which traditionally provided a comparative advantage to energy intensive production. 
The advantage of hydraulic power resources also relates to the third characteristic of a longstanding voluntary 
ban on nuclear energy, which is still rare among the industrialized economies.  
A broad set of policies addresses the objective of increasing energy efficiency. To begin with, the new Energy 
Efficiency Law (Republik Österreich, 2014) is the focal point of Austria’s regulatory approach in this area. It 
came into force at the beginning of 2015, adopting EU guidelines that demand energy efficiency gains of 20 
percent until 2020 (relative to 2005). It aims for a combination of regulatory rigor and dynamic incentives 
through a combination of bureaucratic control and (indirect) market mechanisms. At its core, energy suppliers 
(except small ones) must prove concrete measures to achieve annual efficiency gains of 0.6 percent relative to 
their previous year’s total energy sales. These efficiency gains may originate either from their own operations 
or from its customers and depend on the ratio of energy inputs to output (i.e., not on total energy use). Missing 
the target triggers a compensatory penalty, which is paid to a fund that promotes energy saving activities.  
While energy using firms are not directly charged for missing the target, they are allowed to sell their efficiency 
measures to their energy supplier. Similarly, there is no regulatory protection against suppliers discriminating 
prices to the disadvantage of firms that cannot offer such savings. The law thus anticipates positive and 
negative market incentives, which feed back to the energy using firms and will be determined by the supply 
and demand for energy efficiency measures. In addition, the law commands large companies either to install a 
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proper energy management system, or to have an energy audit every four years. Due to legal proceedings 
instituted by opponents of the law, uncertainties about the details of implementation maintained for most of 
the year. These uncertainties mainly concerned the eligibility of measures, which must be reported to the 
Austrian Energy Agency (AEA) as the federal energy efficiency monitor. Many firms regard this an undue 
bureaucratic burden, affecting a generally negative attitude towards the law. 3  
Different e.g. from recycling activities, the Austrian system provides little scope for broad-scale voluntary 
agreements in the field of energy efficiency. 
The Austrian tax authorities collect taxes and levies on the use of electricity, fossil fuels (petroleum, natural and 
liquid gas) and coal, which are generally based on physical units ("unit taxes"). Initially introduced for fiscal 
purposes, their design also reflects the trade-off between ecological motives and industrial policy concerns. 
From the perspective of environmental economics, taxes have the advantage of providing sustained incentives 
to reduce emissions down to the last unit (Köppl and Schratzenstaller, 2015). They are economically most 
effective as a flat rate that applies to the energy content or implied carbon emissions (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 
1971). The Austrian system violates both principles, applying different rates that depend on the energy source 
and kind of use (e.g., power vs. heating fuels) and imposing a ceiling for energy-intensive firms in 
manufacturing production (Kletzan-Slamanig and Köppl, 2016). In 2004 the ceiling of the energy levy was raised 
from 0.3% to a maximum of 0.5% of value added. In 2002 the discrimination in favour of manufacturing 
prompted a continuing legal dispute about whether the ceiling must also apply to other sectors (currently 
proceeded at the European Court of Justice). As a consequence, the energy levy accounts only for 10 percent of 
the total environmental taxes (most of the latter relate to transportation such as mineral tax and insurance 
taxes based on engine-capacity). Taken together, environmental taxes amount only to 6 percent of total tax 
revenues, which is considerably below the EU average (Köppl and Schratzenstaller, 2015).  
Austria participates in the EU CO2 emission trading scheme, which was considerably reshaped for the period 
2013 to 2020. While in general, the free allocation of emission permits will continuously decrease and be 
replaced by competitive auctions, sectors that are particularly exposed to "carbon leakage" remain exempted 
and will benefit from the undiminished free allocation of emission rights.  
Finally turning to public subsidies, targeted programs towards the innovation of new energy related 
technologies are procured by the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), which is the national funding 
agency for industrial research and development. The current program for “energy research” is the third in a 
consecutive series of targeted promotion schemes since 2008. The activities of the FFG are complemented by 
targeted subsidies for the adoption of energy-saving technologies via the Environmental Promotion scheme 
that is administrated by the Kommunalkredit Public Consulting (kpc). 
 
 
                                                                
3 This seems to have affected also a negative attitude by many of the (non-)respondent firms in Austria, which erroneously 
associated the enterprise survey on energy efficiency with the new regulation, or attempts for further policy initiatives. 
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3. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Given the presence of market failures concerning the adoption of environmentally friendly technologies (see, 
e.g., Jaffe and Stavins 1994), theoretical studies argue that long-term incentives to adopt environmentally 
friendly technologies are stronger under market-based instruments (e.g. subsidies, taxes) than they are under 
command-and-control instruments (see e.g. Downing and White 1986, Milliman and Prince 1989). There are at 
least two reasons for this. First, market-based instruments have dynamic advantages. They tend to give 
permanent incentives to further decrease the environmental burden of the production process, since any 
further improvement of the environmental performance yields lower costs in the form of permits that can be 
sold, subsidies that can be received, or taxes that can be saved (see e.g. Jaffe and Stavins 1995, Cleff and 
Rennings 1999). Secondly, market-based instruments allow for a cost effective response to environmental 
issues, the firm can choose the most cost-effective way to improve its environmental performance according to 
its characteristics. In contrast, environmental standards and regulations allow for a less flexible firm response 
and have adverse dynamic characteristics, since once a standard or the regulatory requirements have been 
satisfied, there are hardly any incentives to further adopt newer technologies to abate contamination (Jaffe 
and Stavins 1995).4  
Voluntary agreements are a third type of instruments to pursue the goal of more environmentally friendly 
production processes5 (Cleff and Rennings 1999, Croci 2005, Veugelers 2012). They can be individual 
agreements or collective or branch agreements. Voluntary agreements share the dynamic advantages of 
market-based instruments; however, they are even more flexible, which contributes to efficiency and 
effectiveness and they can be applied to a variety of circumstances taking into account local and branch 
peculiarities. Given these advantages from a point of view of a policy maker, it is still questionable “why firms 
should enter into such agreements”. Croci (2005, pp. 11) suggests a number of reasons. For instance, firms 
want to avoid stricter regulation (see also Rondinelli and Berry 2000, Florida and Davison 2001), or lower the 
adaption costs through better information which results from the negotiations to reach an agreement, they can 
gain reputation and most importantly they obtain their flexibility in choosing the adaptation process. Although 
these aspects point at the superiority of voluntary agreements, their effectiveness might suffer, since voluntary 
agreements does not necessarily involve all polluters and enforcement is usually less strictly. Due to their 
cooperative nature and their flexibility, it is likely that such agreements—at least in markets with a relatively 
low diffusion rate of green energy technologies—essentially support the diffusion of such technologies.    
Market demand for environmentally friendly produced products is considered as a fourth type of incentive. 
Arguing from the perspective of the focal firm, market-based instruments, regulation, and voluntary 
agreements are strongly related to its cost side, whereas the demand side is largely ignored in studies about 
technology adoption, although it should be one of the most effective forces for profit oriented firms, since it 
                                                                
4 See also Stucki and Woerter (2016) for an overview of theoretical arguments in favor of market based 
policies.  
5 A comprehensive categorization of voluntary agreements includes voluntary public schemes, negotiated 
agreements, unilateral commitments recognized by the public administration, unilateral commitments, third 
party initiatives, and private agreements (Croci 2005, p. 7)  
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provides full technological flexibility and low transaction costs. Hence, market demand (policy driven or not) for 
environmentally friendly produced products should be an effective factor for adopting environmentally friendly 
technologies.  
Following the literature (see, e.g., Cleff and Rennings 1999) it is clearly that both, costs and the demand factor 
are important for the adoption decision of a firm. However, it is difficult to identify, which policy instruments 
are most effective in encouraging the adoption, since the design of the instruments, the characteristics of the 
regulator (Requate and Unold 2003), and the characteristics of the affected firms play a role as well (Croci 
2005, Jaffe and Stavins 1995, Magat 1978, Malueg 1989, McHugh 1985). However, given that only regulation 
shows serious theoretical adverse characteristics, we want to formulate our first hypothesis:  
H1: Regulation is less effective than market-based policies, voluntary agreements, or demand to 
increase the propensity of technology adoption  
In order to observe far reaching positive environmental effects of technology adoption is not sufficient that 
energy-related technologies are adopted, it is essential that such technologies also diffuse within the firm 
(intra-firm diffusion) or to express it differently, that they are used intensively. But how policies can also 
increase the intensity of adoption? Actually we could assume that the expected policy effect resembles the 
effect for the adoption. However, this is not necessarily the case for at least two reasons.  
First, the benefits from the environmentally friendly policy regime are fully exploited with installing a specific 
technology, e.g., an end-of-pipe solution if the regulation requires it, and no further incentives are provided. 
The same is true for voluntary agreements. Ones the condition of a such an agreement are met, and the 
environmental friendliness of a new, e.g., production technology, is secured and communicated, e.g. with a 
label, then there might be no further incentives to invest more in environmental friendly technologies 
(intensity of adoption). However, this is not necessarily the case with taxes/levies or subsidies. Those 
instruments potentially provide dynamic advantages, meaning that the benefits increase proportionately with 
the intensity of adoption. This brings us to the second reason.  
Second, a proportional increase of benefits resulting from the policy framework is likely to be insufficient to 
induce further environmentally friendly investments, since the costs for additional energy savings increase 
disproportionately, similar to abatement costs. Kuik et al. 2009 in a meta-analysis of marginal abatement costs 
identified a very skewed distribution meaning that the median abatement cost level is significantly lower than 
the means of abatement costs. This indicates that the marginal costs increase disproportionally unless 
technological development significantly lowers them (Baker et al. 2008). Hence, firms have to make 
disproportionately greater financial efforts to reduce energy consumption beyond a level that is suggested by 
the dominant technology and without incentives resulting from an improved design of the environmental 
policy (Hemmelskamp 1997, Kerr and Newell 2003) or other economics factors, like the market structure, 
technological opportunities, demand factors, or the energy intensity, the focal firm is unlikely to improve its 
environmental performance by increasing its investments. However, the policy effects on investment intensity 
are not necessarily positive. Zhao (2003) confirmed the results of Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung et al. 
(1996) stating that market based policies, like emission pricing, can even lower the incentives to intensively 
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invest in abatement technologies or–in our case–energy-saving technologies, since tradable permits should 
become cheaper the more firms adopt environmentally friendly process technologies. However, under 
investment uncertainty, specific types of policies can reduce investment incentives. Zhao (2003) found that 
emission charges are likely to reduce investment incentives, even greater than under tradable permits. Our 
second hypothesis reads as follows:  
H2: The policy effects for higher investments in green-energy technologies are lower than for the adoption 
propensity.  
Empirical studies on adoption propensity (inter-firm diffusion) 
The empirical evidence vastly confirms H1. Kerr and Newell (2003) investigated the technology adoption 
behavior of refineries during the lead phasedown in the USA and they found that the adoption propensity of 
refineries with low compliance costs was greater under market-based lead regulation than under performance 
standards. Jaffe and Stavins (1995) investigated the adoption decision for thermal insulation technologies 
under different policy regimes; these are taxes, subsidies, and technology standards. They found that the 
technological cost effect is three times larger than the adoption effect of energy savings over the whole 
lifetime of the investment. Hence, it is comprehensible that subsidies exert a much higher positive effect than 
taxes on the adoption propensity. Quite contrary to subsidies, the building codes (command-and-control 
instrument) did not contribute to the diffusion of insulation technologies. Since the observed building codes did 
not make any significant differences to the existing building practices, the authors cannot exclude that more 
stringent codes might have had an effect.  
Switching to studies based on European data, Van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2015) used Dutch survey data from 
four different sources–environmental cost survey, the energy use survey, the community innovation survey, 
and the production statistic survey–to investigate the policy effects for the adoption of environmentally 
friendly process innovation. Applying a structural model in the spirit of the CDM (Crepon, Mairesse, Duguet 
1998) model, they found that levies and regulation are positively correlated with environmentally friendly 
investments in process innovation (0/1 decision). However, due to the dependent variable (eco investments 
0/1) it was not possible to insert subsidies in the adoption equation, which might drive the observed effects of 
the other policy variables (levies, regulation). Cleff and Rennings (1999) used German data and investigated the 
policy effect on “innovation integrated measures on the process level”. They found evidence that the so-called 
“soft” factors are very supportive to environmentally friendly process innovations, whereas among other state 
regulation did not show any effect. The term soft-factors refers to voluntary agreements and informational 
instruments. Frondel et al. (2007) also investigated environmentally friendly innovation decisions based on 
survey data for Germany. Their results suggest that the adoption of cleaner production technologies tends to 
be market driven and not so much by regulatory measures. Similarily, Horbach et al. (2012) investigated the 
influence of policies on firms’ decision for adopting environmentally friendly process innovations. They 
identified technologies according to their environmental impact; for instance, to save energy or to reduce C02 
emissions. Concerning energy-related technologies they found that self-commitment (voluntary agreements) 
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and demand for environmentally friendly produced products show a significant and positive effect; regulation 
and even subsidies were not significantly related to energy-related processes innovations.  
Veugelers (2012) used adoption motives as a measure of policy affectedness. Based on Flemish CIS-data she 
assessed the responsiveness of firms to environmentally friendly policy interventions. Besides the generation of 
green technologies, she also assessed the effect of the policies on the propensity to adopt environmentally 
friendly technologies. She found that regulations/taxes show a larger effect than subsidies and voluntary 
industry codes and agreements are important drivers for introducing environmentally friendly technologies.  
Demirel and Kesidou (2011) used data from 289 UK firms stemming from the Government Survey of 
Environmental Protection Expenditure by Industry’ in years 2005 and 2006. They measured the use of cleaner 
production technologies by their investment level. Hence they investigated both the effect of policies on the 
adoption decision (0/1) and on the intensity of adoption (see below). Neither regulation nor the market based 
instrument (taxes) showed a significant effect in the full model specification.  
Empirical studies on the level of investment (Intra-firm diffusion) 
The empirical evidence about the relative inducement effect of several environmental policies for the intra-
firm diffusion of green energy technologies is relatively scarce.  
Van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2015) could use a comprehensive Dutch data set (see above) and they did not only 
investigate the 0/1 choice for process-integrated, environmentally friendly investments, they also investigated 
the policy effects on the investment intensity using the CDM (1998) framework. The 0/1 choice and the 
intensity effects have been estimated simultaneously taking into account potential selection issues. They found 
that subsidies and regulation show a significant effect for investment intensity (Leeuwen and Mohnen 2015). 
Moreover, energy intensity is also significant and positively related with the dependent variable.6  
Stucki and Woerter (2016) based on Swiss survey data could not observe the relationship between different 
type of policies and non-political, voluntary agreements and the adoption decision (0/1). However, they could 
observe the effect of different instruments on the number of environmentally friendly, energy-related 
technologies along the value added chain of a firm. Considering potential selection issues they found that taxes 
and regulation are the most effective policy instruments for increasing the intra-firm diffusion of 
environmentally friendly, energy-related technologies. Taking into account non-political motives, it turned out 
that “voluntary agreements” do significantly increase the adoption intensity and that they are even more 
effective than policy measures. Hence, taxes, regulation, and voluntary agreements are the most important 
motives for the intra-firm adoption of green energy technologies. 
Like mentioned above, Demirel and Kesidou (2011) used firm level information about 289 UK firms and 
measured the level of investments into integrated cleaner production technologies. In their main estimations 
neither environmental regulation nor environmental taxes significantly increased the investments in cleaner 
production technologies.  
                                                                
6 However, if they lag the non-policy covariates by two periods the effect of regulation gets insignificant. (see 
earlier version of the paper: Leeuwen and Mohnen 2013). 
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Given these empirical results so far, we get the impression that the observed results strongly depend on the 
measurement of policies, the number of types of policies controlled for in the model, and the measurement of 
the intensity variable. Leeuwen and Mohnen (2015) for the Netherlands and Demirel and Kesidou (2011) for 
the UK measured the intensity of the adoption of process-integrated technologies by the size of investments 
and Stucki and Woerter (2016) for Switzerland counted the number of different technologies adopted to 
measure the intra-firm diffusion of energy-related technologies and all three studies present quite different 
results. Hence, the empirical findings concerning H2 are mixed and the measurement issues gain in importance.    
 
4. Survey and data description 
We designed a particular questionnaire in order to collect the data necessary to test the above mentioned 
hypotheses.7 This questionnaire laid the basis for a comprehensive survey with the topic “creation and 
adoption of energy-related technologies”, carried out simultaneously in three countries (Austria, Germany, and 
Switzerland) in 2015. It was sent to 5789 Swiss firms (KOF-Enterprise Panel), 6374 German firms (ZEW-
Enterprise Panel) and 7091 Austrian firms (WIFO Enterprise Panel). The representative firm samples for the 
respective countries comprise the whole manufacturing, service, and construction sector. It is a stratified 
random sample, whereas stratification takes place on the two-digit industry level and on three industry-specific 
firm size classes (with full coverage of large companies)8.  
The response rates are quite different across the countries. The survey yielded valid information for 1815 firms 
(31.4%), 2321 (36.4%), and 539 firms (7.6%) for the countries Switzerland, Germany, and Austria respectively. 
Given the very demanding questionnaire the response rates for Switzerland and Germany are satisfying, 
whereas the return from Austrian companies was disappointing for various reasons.9 However, a 
comprehensive recall action in all three countries ensures that we received a sufficient large number of 
answers covering all industries and all firm size classes according to the sampling scheme (cells). Only for 
Austria some cells could not be filled.  
Due to missing values for some questions the estimations presented in this paper are based on 3465 
observations. However, due to specific questions referring only to a subgroup of firms, the number of 
observation can be lower (see estimations below). 
                                                                
7 Publicly availabel data is not sufficient to identify the relative effects of different policies. It need survey data 
for at least two reasons (see Stucki et al. 2016). First, to get a complete picture, all relevant policies would need 
to be identified, which is hardly possible as they can be firm/sector- and technology- specific. Second, also the 
stringency of single policies matters, which is a difficult to measure and hardly available from public sources 
(Shadbegian and Wolverton 2010, Xing and Kolstad 2002). The difficulty arises, since different policies typically 
cover different firms or policies may exist at multiple levels (e.g. federal and local), and monitoring and 
enforcement are imperfect (Millimet and Roy 2015). 
8 See Arvanitis et al. (2016) for the full sample information.  
9 In part, the lower return in Austria was expected, since different from the German and Swiss samples, we had 
no established innovation panel to rely on. Return rates for so called “cold” panels, where all firms must be 
contacted de novo are generally lower. However, we also experienced unanticipated problems, which relate to 
the introduction of a new energy efficiency law in Austria (see the previous Section). 
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The questionnaire contains questions about some basic firm characteristics (sales, exports, employment, 
investment and employees’ education). Moreover, it contains questions about the importance of energy-
related factors, like energy-related taxes and levies, energy-related regulations, energy-related voluntary 
agreements, public subsidies, and demand related factors. Moreover, we have information about the 
fluctuation of energy prices and (feared) bottlenecks in energy supply. A unique characteristic of the 
questionnaire is that all firms needed to answer such policy related factors, independently if they adopted 
energy-relevant technologies or not. This has the advantage that we can identify the meaning of the policy 
environment for all firms and not only for firms that have already adopted environmentally friendly, energy-
related technologies, like it is usually found for policy related questions in the CIS (Community Innovation 
Survey) type of questionnaire. Hence, we can contrast (for the first time) the effectiveness of policy related 
factor for the adoption stage (inter-firm diffusion) with their meaning for the intensity stage (intra-firm 
diffusion).  
Table 1 presents the variable definitions and some descriptive information for the variables included in our 
main estimations. 50% of the responding firms adopted environmentally friendly, energy-related technologies 
and on average they spent around 39000 Euros for the adoption of such technologies.10 On average firms 
perceive taxes (1.71) as the most relevant energy-related policy followed by regulations (1.49) and public 
subsidies (1.46). Firms also perceive high/volatile energy prices as a relative important characteristic of their 
energy-related environment. 54% of our sample firms export, 11% are foreign-owned and 38% have R&D 
activities. The competition intensity–measured by the number of principal competitors–is moderate on the 
means level; firms tend to operate in markets with less than 15 competitors worldwide. The energy costs are 
on average about 115000 Euros, however, the distribution seems to be rather skewed, since there are few 
firms with rather high values. Adoption of environmentally friendly, energy relevant technology is no topic or 
has not been discussed for 39% of the firms.  
Table 2 presents some country specific information. First, we see different adoption propensity ranging from 
about 40% in Switzerland to 56% in Austria. Moreover, we see that taxes are perceived as more relevant in 
Germany than in the other countries, voluntary agreements are of relatively high relevance in Switzerland, and 
public subsidies is the dominant policy factor in Austria.  
Correlation coefficients for the main model variables are presented in Table 3. Most importantly we see that 
the dependent variables are significant and positively related with the energy-relevant factors, whereas the 
correlation coefficients tend to be higher for the adoption variable then for the investment variable (except 
regulation). Among the policy relevant factors, we also see positive and significant correlation with relatively 
high coefficients between demand and subsidies, subsidies and voluntary agreements, voluntary agreements 
and regulation, and regulation and taxes. Hence, the correlations indicate that it is important to insert all 
factors in the model to identify the effects precisely.   
 
                                                                
10 These are unweighted figures; for the representative figures please refer to Arvanitis et al. 2016.  
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5. Econometric framework  
In order to analyse the effects of different types of policies on the inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of 
environmentally friendly, energy-related technologies, respectively, we refer to an econometric framework in 
the spirit of Battisti et al. (2009), which is an extension of Karshenas and Stoneman (1995). Such models have 
been applied, e.g., by Hollenstein and Woerter (2008) for E-commerce adoption, by Arvanitis and Ley (2013) in 
terms of inter- and intra-firm diffusion of energy-saving technologies, or by Stucki and Woerter (2016)11 
concerning the intra-firm diffusion of energy-related technologies. 
According to Battisti et al. (2009), the first use (inter-firm diffusion) of a new technology and the intensity of its 
usage (intra-firm diffusion) in time t by firm i in industry j, Di(t), are determined by five categories of variables: 
First, a vector of characteristics of a firm Ri(t) and its environment Rj(t) reflecting rank effects12 referring to, 
e.g., energy intensity, competition, qualification of the employees, or demand. Secondly, the extent of industry 
usage of new technology SOj(t) to capture inter-firm stock and order effects13 (i.e., market-intermediated 
externalities). Thirdly, epidemic effects14 (i.e., learning and network non-market intermediated externalities) 
reflecting either the firm’s own experience with the new technology Ei(t), often proxied by the time since the 
firm’s first adoption, or the experience gained from observing other firms Ej(t) (often measured by the extent 
of technology diffusion among similar firms in time t). Fourthly, the expected adoption cost of a unit 
technology Pi(t) that is constituted by two parts: one common to all firms, e.g., the price of a new, energy 
efficient technology; and a second one reflecting firm-specific adjustment and installation costs. Fifthly, in 
accordance to the particular conditions of the introduction of green energy technologies in Switzerland (as in 
many other countries), also elements of the literature on induced innovation and technology diffusion (see, 
e.g., Binswanger 1974) are taken into consideration. The diffusion of green energy technologies can be 
positively influenced (a) through increases of energy prices and/or taxes (see, e.g., Linn 2008 and Jacobs et al. 
2009) and (b) through public regulation and/or public incentives (subsidies), and/or “voluntary agreements” to 
use green energy technologies (see, e.g., Popp et al. 2009, Croci 2005). We consider a vector IAi(t) of variables 
that capture the influence of such factors (inducement effects). We therefore arrive at the following equation 
that we use for estimating the adoption models: 
                                                                
11 Stucki and Woerter (2016) provide a very similar econometric framwork, however their estimations are 
limited to intra-firm diffusion and they could not–due to the lack of policy information–compare policy effects 
for inter- and intra-firm diffusion or apply this framework simultaneously to different countries.   
12 Rank effects refer to firm heterogeneity that could lead to differing returns to adoption and consequently to 
different adoption behavior (Davies 1979, Ireland and Stoneman 1986). 
13 Stock and order effects refer to market-intermediated externalities either due to early-mover advantages 
(order effect) or lower adoption costs due to a higher number of firms utilizing a technology (stock effect) 
(Battisti et al. 2009). 
14 Epidemic effects refer to learning and network effects either from the firm’s own experience gained from 
using a technology or the knowledge gained from observing other users of the technology (Hollenstein and 
Woerter 2008, Battisti et al. 2009). 
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Di(t) = f{Ri(t), Rj(t), SOj(t), Ei(t), Ej(t), Pi(t), IAi(t)}      (1) 
 
For the empirical implementation of the model, we follow as far as possible Arvanitis and Ley (2013) and Stucki 
Woerter (2016). Firm-specific rank effects are measured by (a) the firm’s number of employees, (b) gross 
physical investments, (c) the qualification level of the employees, (d) R&D activities, (e) export activities, (f) 
foreign ownership, and (g) the relevance of energy-related technologies for the focal firm. The R&D activities 
and the qualification level of the employees also control for the firms’ absorption capacity, which is important 
as not each company has the same conditions to deal with the adoption of new energy-related technologies. 
Moreover, we inserted the control variable for the relevance of energy-related technologies for the focal firm 
controlling for firms without a relevant technological base or a non-technological orientation and, hence, such 
technology issues do not apply and consequently have not been discussed internally. Rank effects as to the 
firms’ market environments are measured by (a) the intensity of competition, (b) the energy environment 
characterized by high/volatile energy prices and energy shortage, (c) industry affiliation, and (d) country 
dummies. Based on cross-sectional data it is hardly possible to separate epidemic effects from stock and order 
effects. Hence we measure a net effect of the two by including the mean of adopted technologies within the 
firm’s two-digit industry (without the focal firm).15 Based on the survey results the Adoption costs could not be 
measured effectively, since the perception of obstacles frequently increases with adoption activities and 
consequently is clearly endogenous. Information about market prices of technologies and internal adjustment 
costs are not available for the sample of firms we could use. Finally, in order to capture inducement effects we 
control for (a) the firm’s energy costs and most importantly for this paper (b), the firm’s political environment, 
which is measured by variables referring to regulation, subsidies and energy taxes. Furthermore, we can 
distinguish these standard policy factors from alternative drivers of energy-related technology adoption, we 
control for (d) “voluntary agreements”, and (e) the demand for environmentally friendly produced products. 
See Table 1 to Table 3 for the variable definitions and descriptive statistics, respectively. 
An important feature of existing empirical investigations about policy induced adoption based on survey data is 
that the meaning of the policy environment of non-adopter is not observed. For instance, in the CIS the policy 
effects are usually identified as a motivational question referring only to firms that have already adopted such 
technologies, e.g. “how important were the following factors in driving your decisions to introduce innovations 
with environmental benefits?” Consequently, information about the policy affectedness of non-adaptors is 
missing meaning that such data sets lack policy information for firms that did not adopt an environmentally 
friendly technology although they are potentially exposed to the same policy pressure than adopting firms. For 
the study at hand we designed a specific set of questions that allows for policy information for non-adaptors as 
well. Hence we can compare policies that drive the adoption (inter-firm diffusion) with policies that drive the 
intensity of adoption (intra-firm diffusion).  
                                                                
15 In order to separate the epidemic effects from other industry-specific effects, we add industry fixed effects to 
the model.  
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Although we have policy information for adoptors and non-adoptors, we can only observe investments in 
energy-related, environmentally friendly technologies (our dependent variable), if a firm adopted such a 
technology, and we do not observe the investment behavior if such technologies have been not adopted.16 
Moreover, we have an interest in the parameters of the selection equation and of the intensity equation. 
Hence, we apply a sample selection estimator which is formulated according to Heckman (1979) and Amemiya 
(1985).  
In econometric terms we face the following problem:  
y1 = x1β1 + u1      (1) 
y2 = 1[xδ2 + v2 > 0]     (2) 
Let y1 be our investments in adoption of environmentally friendly, energy-related technologies and y2 is the 
binary variable indicating the adoption of such a technology; x and y2 are always observed and y1 is only 
observed if y2 equals 1. u1 and v2 are independent of x and have zero mean, whereas v ∼ Normal(0,1); x1 is a 
strict subset of x; and E(u1|v2) = γ1v2 
Basically we could estimate (1) consistently and efficiently if the (here) unobserved γ1 = 0, indicating that we do 
not have a selection problem. However, since we cannot be sure that this is the case, we follow the Heckman 
(1979) procedure, which allows us to estimate  
E(y1|x,y2 = 1) = x1β1 + γ1λ(xδ2) 
where λ(×) is the inverse mills ratio. Here, γ1 can be observed by inserting the inverse mills ratio in the model 
and if it is zero, equation (1) does not suffer from a selection bias and the coefficients are consistently and 
efficiently estimated (see Wooldridge 2010, pp. 803). δ2 is available from the first stage probit estimation, 
which is only consistently estimated if x contains one variable that affects y2 –the selection equation–but does 
not have a partial effect on y1 (see Wooldridge 2002, p. 562). In the paper at hand we can use the epidemic 
variable in the selection equation as the necessary exclusion restriction; it is significantly positively related to 
the adoption propensity (y2) and has no effect on y1.17 
A potential problem is the possible endogeneity of some of the right-hand variables that would imply 
inconsistent estimates. Endogeneity might arrive not so much from the policies per se, since the design of the 
policies is clearly beyond the influence of a single firm and they likely perceive them as an exogenous shock, 
however, the endogeneity issue might result from the “subjective” assessment of the importance of the 
respective policies. We asked the firms to assess how important (on a 3 point Likert-scale) are taxes, subsidies, 
voluntary agreements, regulation, and demand for them. These assessments might be correlated with some 
unobserved firm factors that can bias our coefficients. However, since a broad set of observables that generally 
                                                                
16 A firm might have invested in clarifying a potential adoption and finally did not do it, since the adoption 
project failed.  
17 In order to estimate the heckman procedure we use the heckman command as implemented in STATA 13 
with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors; we use the full maximum likelihood version of the estimator.  
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affect the firms’ adoption activities is included in the estimation equations besides the policy variables18, our 
main results should at least not be affected by an omitted variable bias. We do not see why the used policy 
measures should systematically share a common unmeasured cause with the firms’ adoption intensity;19 we do 
not see a “common response” bias, since the questions about the policy environment are not related to the 
questions about technology adoption. We thus expect that the policy variables affect the firms’ adoption 
intensity directly and endogeneity is not a main concern. However, we do not claim causal relationships. 
We are not only interested in the policy effects for the adoption propensity (inter-firm diffusion) and the level 
of investments of adoption (intra-firm diffusion), we are also interested, if there are differences among the 
participating countries. In order to identify differences, we interacted all covariates with the country dummies 
respectively. This has the advantage that we directly observe, if the detected differences are significant.  
 
6. Results 
Table 4 presents the main results of our estimations. The results of both stages of the heckman estimation are 
presented in column 2 and 3.  
Adoption propensity (Inter-firm diffusion) 
Most importantly, we see that taxes, voluntary agreements, public subsidies, and demand significantly induce 
the adoption of environmentally friendly, energy-related process innovations (green energy technologies); 
firms that identified such factors as important are significantly more likely to adopt such technologies. The 
results for the control variables in the model indicate that the adoption propensity is higher for larger firms, 
firms with R&D activities, and firms with greater gross tangible investments. The epidemic variable is also 
significantly and positively related with the adoption propensity of the focal firm. The results also unveil that 
(feared) bottlenecks in energy supply significantly decrease the adoption propensity and forces firms to stick to 
traditional technologies and that high/volatile energy prices urge firms to adopt green energy technologies. 
Referring to the econometric framework presented above we see that firm specific rank effects and epidemic 
effects are important, however, the inducement effects resulting from the policy environment appear to be 
very important for the adoption propensity; here, only regulations (including CO2 certificates, which are 
toothless in all three countries) do not show a significant effect indicating that the regulatory requirements 
have been already fulfilled by the firms before the period under investigation, hence, lacking any further 
incentives for technological improvements. This clearly points at the “dynamic” disadvantages of regulations, 
presented in the literature review; regulations usually do not require to adopt the best available technological 
solution; ones the requirements are fulfilled no further environmentally friendly activities can be expected. 
                                                                
18 We control for unobserved heterogeneity on the sector level (2-digit level). Moreover, we have a very 
comprehensive control vector correcting for most of the factors that might influence the assessment; such 
factors are the energy intensity of the focal firm, its R&D activities, the education level of the employees, 
foreign ownership, size, basic relevance of environmental issues, intensity of competition, export activities, and 
other investment activities. 
19 Even more so as we are primarily interested in the effects of the different policy types relative to each other. 
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Hence, we cannot reject H1 meaning that regulations are indeed less effective than market-based policies, 
voluntary agreements, or demand to increase the propensity of green energy technology adoption. 
 
 
Level of investments (intra-firm diffusion) 
The heckman estimation presented in column 1 (intensity) and column 2 (selection) in Table 4 shows that both 
equations are independent and that the intensity equation is not affected by the selection issue; the Wald test 
on independence of equations (rho = 0) is insignificant.  
The most striking result is that all but one proxy for energy-related (policy) factors are insignificant, indicating 
that the current political framework and policy related factors are less relevant for the firms’ decision to 
increase its investment in green energy technologies (intra-firm diffusion); this is in stark contrast to the results 
for the adoption decision presented above. Only the importance of subsidies is significant and positively 
related with the amount of investments.20 Referring to H2, our results clearly show that the policies are less 
relevant for the amount of investments in green-energy technologies rather than for the adoption propensity. 
Moreover, we see that the energy costs are also significant in the intensity equation signalling that firm specific 
energy-related factors are more important than policy inducement for the amount of investments. It is also 
remarkable that investments tend to increase in an energy environment that is characterised by high/volatile 
energy prices, whereas feared energy shortage does not affect the amount of investments.    
Country comparisons21 
Given the different institutional framework in the investigated countries (see above), it is plausible to assume 
that the investigated types of policies show different effects. And in fact we find that taxes are significantly 
more effective for the adoption decision of a firm in Germany than in Austria and Switzerland (Table 4, column 
6 and 7). We also see differences in terms of voluntary agreements, which are significantly less effective in 
Austria than in Germany and Switzerland. To the contrary, public subsidies are more effective (important) in 
Austria and demand related factors for environmentally friendly produced products tend to be more effective 
in Switzerland compared to Germany. Concerning regulation, we do not see significant differences across 
countries. 
The results are quite different for the amount of investments (intra-firm diffusion). Public subsidies are 
significantly more effective in Germany and Austria than in Switzerland. We do not detect any differences for 
all other policy related factors.  
                                                                
20 Please note that the perception of subsidies as a stringent policy measure does not „mechanically“ increase 
the amount of investments. 
21 The estimations for the single countries are presented in the Appendix Table A1. Basically the general results 
presented above hold for all three countries with few exceptions. Concerning the propensity: voluntary 
agreements are significant and negative for Austria and taxes are only significant and positive for Germany. 
Concerning the intensity, subsidies are not significant in Switzerland.  
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EXTENSIONS 
Marginal effects 
Although we cannot claim to present causal effects, we want to give an impression about the size of the effects 
of the observed policies and policy related factors; Table 5 presents the marginal effects. The probability of a 
randomly chosen firm to adopt any green energy technology–in our sample–is 49%. This figure fluctuates 
between 40% in Switzerland and 56% in Austria. Moreover, we see that the adoption probability significantly 
increases with the relevance of taxes (47%-53%), voluntary agreements (48%-58%), public subsidies (44%-68%) 
and demand (47%-58%), whereas public subsidies are related with the relatively strongest increase in the 
adoption probability. There are country differences. The relatively largest increase in adoption probability 
results from public subsidies in all three countries. Voluntary agreements and demand are increasing the 
adoption propensity in Switzerland by 21%-points and 23%-points, respectively. Taxes increase the adoption 
propensity in Germany by 13%-points and demand shows a relatively strong effect in Austria (+27%-points).  
Technology specific effects and certified management systems 
Table 6 presents the results for specific types of green energy technologies and energy saving certified 
management systems (e.g. environmental certification ISO 140001, Energy-management ISO 50001, 
environmental-/energy-target declaration, periodical environmental-/energy-reports). We included the 
certified management systems to the simultaneous estimation procedure, since previous literature shows that 
they are immediately related to technology adoption. For instance, Frondel et al. (2007) found that 
organizational measures are very important for the adoption of environmentally friendly process innovations. 
Also Khanna et al. 2009 presents evidence for a strong and significant relationship between totally quality 
management and the adoption of pollution prevention technologies.  
Demand related factors are important for the adoption of all identified technologies, whereas the adoption of 
energy saving technologies in the field of production are also significantly promoted by taxes and public 
subsidies. Concerning building technologies, the adoption stimulating effects of voluntary agreements, 
subsidies, and demand are significant. Public subsidies and demand essentially drive the adoption of 
technology to produce energy from renewable sources.  
We also can compare the effects of policy related factors for green technology adoption with firm behaviour 
related to the introduction of energy saving certified management systems. Management systems are 
essentially driven by taxes, voluntary agreements, and subsidies. Demand related factors do not play an 
important role for management systems, which is in stark contrast to green technology adoption.  
Obviously, national promotion plans appear to be relatively ineffective in the transportation sector. Public 
subsidies and demand related factor appear to be effective independent of the type of technology.  
 
7. Conclusions  
We have seen a significant increase in the empirical literature about the adoption of environmentally friendly 
technologies over the last years. Nevertheless, there are some important blind spots that have not been 
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addressed adequately, not at least due to the lack of firm-level data. First, we have still an insufficient 
understanding of the effect of environmental policies (taxes, subsidies, and regulations), voluntary agreements, 
and demand related factors, on the adoption of green energy technologies. Moreover, we know too less about 
their effects on the intensity of technology use and how they impact the adoption of non-technical measures 
(certified management systems). Second, policy makers tend to apply best-practice from other countries. 
However, it is not sure that, e.g., a CO2 tax or a feed-in tariff has the same effects in Germany and in 
Switzerland; the institutional framework matters, and should be seriously considered.  
In the study at hand we try to address those issues by simultaneously estimating the policy effects on the 
propensity and intensity of adoption of green energy technologies. Moreover, we compare the policy effects 
for different technologies and non-technological measures (management systems) in a multivariate estimation 
setting and we simultaneously investigate country specific differences concerning the effects of different types 
of policies for the adoption behaviour.   
The results are based on a comprehensive data set stemming from a firm-level survey in three countries 
(Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) conducted at the same point in time and based on an identical 
questionnaire (see data section). The results reveal that the current policy framework in all three observed 
countries is partly effective for the adoption of such technologies and non-technical measures and it is 
ineffective in terms of the intensity of adoption (intra-firm). Firm specific characteristics drive intra-firm 
adoption whereas primarily voluntary agreements and demand related factors as well as subsidies and taxes 
drive the propensity of adoption (inter-firm adoption). Country specific characteristics play a significant role in 
terms of policy effectiveness. Taxes are more effective in Germany and demand related factors are more 
effective in Switzerland. Public subsidies are more effective in Austria. The results are different for the 
investment intensity (intra-firm diffusion). Here we see that public subsidies tend to be more effective in 
Austria than in Switzerland. However, in order to identify the efficiency of policy instruments, we would have 
to include the economic costs of policies which is beyond the focus of this study and must be left for future 
investigations.  
Policy conclusions 
From the results of this investigation we can draw the following policy conclusions. First and most importantly, 
the results show that the tested types of policy instruments effectively stimulate the adoption of green energy 
technologies and energy management systems, however, they do not have any effect on the intensity of 
adoption. Intensity matters, though, if we want to significantly decreasing the environmental burden. Only the 
importance of subsidies is significantly related to the amount of investments. This implies that policy maker 
should consider the disproportionate increasing cost for adopting green energy technologies. Dynamic policies 
like taxes, usually yield proportional returns which do not compensate for disproportionally increasing costs.  
Apart from that, the energy costs and high/volatile energy prices are raising the investments. Given that we 
consider taxes as a policy instrument in our analysis, both factors (energy costs and volatile energy prices), are 
beyond the immediate influence of national policy makers and would require a more global coordination. 
Hence, our study identifies a lack of policy designs promoting higher amounts of investments in green energy 
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technologies. Second, demand for energy efficiently produced products and services is an important factor for 
the propensity of green energy technology adoption. Policy instruments that raises awareness towards energy-
efficient behaviour among consumers and policies that inform consumers about the energy-efficiency of 
production processes, hence, is an effective stimulus for the adoption of green energy technologies in the firm 
sector. This effect is observed in all three countries and seems to be rather independent of the respective 
institutional framework, however, demand factors tend to be more effective for Swiss firms. Fourth, voluntary 
agreements and standards are significantly related to the adoption of green energy technologies and the 
adoption of energy management systems. Voluntary agreements and standards are partly motivated by 
avoiding public regulations so that one may suspect that the threat of a potential public intervention to be the 
underlying cause for their effectiveness. 
Policy maker relying on a portfolio of different types of policies including subsidies and demand related factors 
are on the save side in terms of their general effectiveness. Taxes and voluntary agreements are also overall 
effective but they show some technology specific patterns, which can be due to the lack of initiatives related 
such instruments. Given the current institutional framework in the respective countries, subsidies are more 
effective in Austria, taxes are more effective in Germany, and demand related factors are relatively more 
effective in Switzerland. This result can have two interpretations. First, subsidies in Austria and taxes in 
Germany are significantly higher than in Switzerland and consequently they are more stringent and effective. 
This also implies that such policy measures are broadly accepted by the firms. Second, these policies are better 
designed in these countries and they better consider the particularities of the firms. Both reasons cannot be 
tested in this framework and must be left for more detailed policy analyses. However, the main lesson is that 
such policies are not effective independent of designs and institutional acceptance.  
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Table 1: Descriptive information  
MAIN VARIABLES Description N Mean SD Min Max 
Adoption 0/1 
(DEPENDENT) 
Adoption of green energy 
technologies, i.e. technologies that 
contribute to increase energy 
efficiency and/or enable the use of 
energy from renewable resources 
3535 0,49  0,00 1,00 
Energy investments (ln) 
(DEPENDENT) 
Investments for the adoption of 
green energy technologies 
1621 10,56 2,46 0,69 18,39 
Taxes The importance of energy-relevant 
taxes and levies for the focal firm 
3535 1,71 0,74 1,00 3,00 
Regulations The importance of energy-relevant 
regulations for the focal firm 
3535 1,49 0,68 1,00 3,00 
Voluntary agreements The importance of energy-relevant 
voluntary agreements or standards 
in the sector of the firm 
3535 1,40 0,63 1,00 3,00 
Public subsidies The importance of energy-relevant 
subsidies for the focal firm 
3535 1,45 0,68 1,00 3,00 
Demand The importance of demand for 
energy efficiently produced products 
3535 1,33 0,60 1,00 3,00 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
High/volatile energy prices The importance of high/volatile 
energy prices 
3535 1,78 0,73 1,00 3,00 
Energy shortage (feared) bottlenecks in energy 
supply 
3535 1,26 0,55 1,00 3,00 
Number of employees (ln) Number of employees  3535 3,91 1,56 0,00 11,63 
Export Export activities 3535 0,54  0,00 1,00 
Foreign owned Focal firm belongs to a foreign firm 3535 0,11  0,00 1,00 
R&D propensity R&D activities of the focal firm 3535 0,38  0,00 1,00 
Share graduated 
employees 
Share of employees with a tertiary 
degree 
3535 17,33 22,68 0,00 100,00 
Competition intensity Number of principal competitors in 
the main sales market of the focal 
firm worldwide; 1 (1-5 competitors), 
2 (6-10), 3 (11-15), 4 (16-50), 5 (50+) 
3535 2,57 1,46 1,00 5,00 
Energy costs Energy costs of the focal firm 3535 11,67 2,21 0,51 20,27 
Gross tangible investments 
(ln) 
Gross tangible investments  3535 12,25 2,34 3,94 21,92 
Epidemic adoption Share of firms that adopted energy-
related technology in the sector of 
the focal firm (excluding the focal 
firm) 
3535 0,45 0,13 0,00 0,94 
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Table 2: Descriptive information per country  
SWITZERLAND N Mean SD Min Max 
Adoption 0/1 1584 0,40 0,49 0,00 1,00 
Energy investments 600 11,28 2,31 3,73 17,29 
Taxes 1584 1,63 0,69 1,00 3,00 
Regulations 1584 1,56 0,70 1,00 3,00 
Voluntary agreements 1584 1,43 0,65 1,00 3,00 
Public subsidies 1584 1,40 0,62 1,00 3,00 
Demand 1584 1,31 0,57 1,00 3,00 
High/volatile energy prices 1584 1,65 0,69 1,00 3,00 
Energy shortage 1584 1,27 0,55 1,00 3,00 
GERMANY      
Adoption 0/1 1633 0,55 0,50 0,00 1,00 
Energy investments 845 9,89 2,42 0,69 18,39 
Taxes 1633 1,79 0,77 1,00 3,00 
Regulations 1633 1,43 0,66 1,00 3,00 
Voluntary agreements 1633 1,36 0,62 1,00 3,00 
Public subsidies 1633 1,49 0,72 1,00 3,00 
Demand 1633 1,34 0,62 1,00 3,00 
High/volatile energy prices 1633 1,92 0,74 1,00 3,00 
Energy shortage 1633 1,24 0,55 1,00 3,00 
AUSTRIA      
Adoption 0/1 300 0,56 0,50 0,00 1,00 
Energy investments 165 11,34 2,25 3,91 17,27 
Taxes 300 1,67 0,75 1,00 3,00 
Regulations 300 1,44 0,66 1,00 3,00 
Voluntary agreements 300 1,40 0,63 1,00 3,00 
Public subsidies 300 1,61 0,75 1,00 3,00 
Demand 300 1,37 0,63 1,00 3,00 
High/volatile energy prices 300 1,76 0,73 1,00 3,00 
Energy shortage 300 1,28 0,58 1,00 3,00 
 
 
  
29 
 
Table 3: Correlation between important variables  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) 
(a) Adoption 0/1 (DEPENDENT) 1,000           
(b) Energy investments 
(DEPENDENT) na 1,000          
 na           
(c) Energy costs 0,241 0,698 1,000         
 0,000 0,000          
(d) Number of employees 0,256 0,681 0,787 1,000        
 0,000 0,000 0,000         
(e) Taxes 0,203 0,158 0,261 0,138 1,000       
 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000        
(f) Regulations 0,178 0,252 0,304 0,216 0,506 1,000      
 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000       
(g) Voluntary agreements 0,210 0,205 0,255 0,197 0,380 0,549 1,000     
 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000      
(h) Public subsidies 0,264 0,141 0,165 0,130 0,318 0,384 0,409 1,000    
 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000     
(i) Demand 0,177 0,054 0,075 0,105 0,155 0,274 0,329 0,420 1,000   
 0,000 0,030 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000    
(j) High/volatile energy prices 0,197 0,178 0,231 0,129 0,597 0,399 0,307 0,291 0,127 1,000  
 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000   
(k) Energy shortage 0,069 0,075 0,110 0,058 0,307 0,282 0,238 0,240 0,171 0,296 1,000 
 0,000 0,003 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000  
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Table 4: Main Estimations   
 Heckman Country Differences: Adoption Country Differences: Intensity 
 Intensity Adoption Reference: Switzerland Reference:  Germany Reference: Switzerland Reference:  Germany 
   Germany Austria Switzerland Austria Germany Austria Switzerland Austria 
MAIN VARIABLES           
Taxes -0.043 0.084*   0.206** -0.155 -0.206** -0.361** 0.101 0.211 -0.101 0.110 
 (0.065) (0.043)    (0.091) (0.173) (0.091) (0.167) (0.148) (0.256) (0.148) (0.237) 
Regulations 0.070 -0.010    -0.119 -0.217 0.119 -0.099 0.037 0.127 -0.037 0.090 
 (0.065) (0.046)    (0.095) (0.189) (0.095) (0.188) (0.143) (0.241) (0.143) (0.230) 
Voluntary agreements -0.008 0.101**  -0.088 -0.478*** 0.088 -0.389** -0.049 -0.215 0.049 -0.167 
 (0.065) (0.047)    (0.095) (0.185) (0.095) (0.186) (0.141) (0.223) (0.141) (0.218) 
Public subsidies 0.182*** 0.300*** -0.070 0.378** 0.070 0.448*** 0.194 0.400** -0.194 0.207 
 (0.056) (0.041)    (0.085) (0.159) (0.085) (0.156) (0.121) (0.187) (0.121) (0.178) 
Demand -0.018 0.176*** -0.159* -0.049 0.159* 0.110 0.056 -0.305 -0.056 -0.361 
 (0.069) (0.046)    (0.094) (0.158) (0.094) (0.157) (0.148) (0.235) (0.148) (0.227) 
CONTROL ENERGY ENVIRONMENT          
High/volatile energy prices 0.222*** 0.098**  -0.010 0.042 0.010 0.052 -0.063 -0.158 0.063 -0.095 
 (0.063) (0.042)    (0.085) (0.173) (0.085) (0.170) (0.138) (0.252) (0.138) (0.242) 
Energy shortage -0.075 -0.098**  -0.018 -0.101 0.018 -0.083 0.013 0.044 -0.013 0.031 
 (0.067) (0.048)    (0.098) (0.178) (0.098) (0.176) (0.151) (0.222) (0.151) (0.210) 
CONTROL FIRM CHARACTERISTICS          
Number of employees 0.261*** 0.078**  -0.065 -0.271** 0.065 -0.206* 0.105 0.237 -0.105 0.133 
 (0.053) (0.031)    (0.063) (0.120) (0.063) (0.118) (0.118) (0.165) (0.118) (0.151) 
Export 0.130 0.103*   -0.094 0.070 0.094 0.165 0.125 0.058 -0.125 -0.067 
 (0.101) (0.059)    (0.115) (0.239) (0.115) (0.240) (0.203) (0.467) (0.203) (0.462) 
Foreign owned 0.210* -0.150*   0.019 -0.111 -0.019 -0.130 0.110 0.157 -0.110 0.047 
 (0.121) (0.077)    (0.182) (0.224) (0.182) (0.257) (0.274) (0.330) (0.274) (0.344) 
R&D propensity -0.088 0.289*** -0.052 -0.097 0.052 -0.045 -0.136 0.267 0.136 0.403 
 (0.097) (0.059)    (0.114) 0.000 (0.114) (0.203) (0.193) 0.000 (0.193) (0.316) 
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Share graduated employees -0.001 0.000    -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.001)    (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
Competition intensity -0.008 0.008    -0.050 0.032 0.050 0.082 -0.061 0.148 0.061 0.209** 
 (0.030) (0.017)    (0.036) (0.070) (0.036) (0.069) (0.064) (0.104) (0.064) (0.100) 
Energy costs 0.186*** 0.044**  0.012 0.057 -0.012 0.045 -0.053 0.048 0.053 0.101 
 (0.035) (0.021)    (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090) 
Gross tangible investments 0.449*** 0.082*** 0.020 0.176*** -0.020 0.155** -0.092 -0.347** 0.092 -0.255** 
 (0.040) (0.018)    (0.038) (0.064) (0.038) (0.063) (0.091) (0.141) (0.091) (0.125) 
COUNTRY CONTROLS           
Swiss firm -0.124 0.027      -0.836       -0.615  
 (0.139) (0.105)      (0.516)       (0.916)  
German firm -0.529*** 0.165*   0.836    0.615    
 (0.140) (0.092)    (0.516)    (0.916)    
Austrian firm    -1.410  -2.246**  2.230*  1.615 
    (0.925)  (0.911)  (1.242)  (1.104) 
EPIDEMIC ADOPTION  2.517*** -0.607 0.530 0.607 1.138     
  (0.353)    (0.723) (0.783) (0.723) (0.813)     
Constant 0.435 -3.978***         
 (0.671) (0.506)            
No. of observations    3439 1621 
Censored/uncensored 1818/1621         
R2    0.63 
Wald test of indep. eqns. 
(rho = 0): chi2 
1.05         
 Wald chi2(48) = 
2525.57*** 
Wald chi2(48) = 719.56*** F(78, 1542) = 39.84*** 
Note: heteroscedasticity robust standard errors; all estimations include 2-digit sector controls; significance levels: (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01).  
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Table 5: Margins  
 Margins 
 Overall Switzerland Germany Austria 
Probabilities (constant) 0.49 0.40 0.55 0.56 
Taxes     
not relevant (1) 0.47 0.40 0.52 0.63 
relevant (2) 0.50 0.40 0.56 0.62 
very relevant (3)  0.53 0.34 0.67 0.53 
     
Regulation     
not relevant (1) 0.50 0.39 0.58 0.64 
relevant (2) 0.46 0.37 0.54 0.52 
very relevant (3)  0.53 0.49 0.56 0.59 
     
Voluntary agreements     
not relevant (1) 0.48 0.37 0.55 0.66 
relevant (2) 0.51 0.40 0.61 0.54 
very relevant (3)  0.58 0.58 0.61 0.37 
     
Public subsidies     
not relevant (1) 0.44 0.35 0.52 0.42 
relevant (2) 0.55 0.44 0.60 0.75 
very relevant (3)  0.68 0.66 0.72 0.89 
     
Demand     
not relevant (1) 0.47 0.37 0.55 0.56 
relevant (2) 0.56 0.44 0.64 0.67 
very relevant (3)  0.58 0.60 0.57 0.83 
     
Fluctuating/high energy prices     
not relevant (1) 0.47 0.37 0.54 0.55 
relevant (2) 0.49 0.41 0.56 0.64 
very relevant (3)  0.54 0.44 0.61 0.66 
     
(Feared) bottlenecks     
not relevant (1) 0.50 0.40 0.58 0.66 
relevant (2) 0.46 0.39 0.53 0.38 
very relevant (3)  0.44 0.33 0.52 0.49 
Note: Probabilities (constant) describe the probability to adopt an environmentally friendly, energy relevant 
technology. This means that the overall probability to adopt such technologies without taking into account 
policies or firm characteristics etc. is 50%.  
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Table 6: Adoption by type of technology and adoption of energy management systems  
 Production ICT Transport Buildings Renewables Manage-
ment 
Taxes 0.092* 0.001 0.010 0.047 0.047 0.194*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.058) (0.047)    
Regulations 0.062 0.030 -0.080 -0.032 -0.078 0.045    
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.045) (0.059) (0.047)    
Voluntary agreements 0.073 0.032 0.079 0.139*** 0.019 0.277*** 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045) (0.058) (0.048)    
Public subsidies 0.189*** 0.152*** 0.040 0.257*** 0.423*** 0.073*   
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.050) (0.043)    
Demand 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.266*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.033    
 (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) (0.045) (0.055) (0.047)    
High/volatile energy prices 0.145*** 0.068 0.129*** 0.075* -0.019 0.030    
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.048) (0.042) (0.054) (0.046)    
Energy shortage 0.001 0.057 -0.005 -0.066 -0.063 -0.020    
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.052) (0.049) (0.060) (0.048)    
Number of employees -0.036 0.075** 0.167*** 0.062** 0.019 0.203*** 
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.039) (0.034)    
Export 0.187*** 0.152** -0.145** 0.056 -0.009 0.178*** 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.073) (0.061) (0.078) (0.066)    
Foreign owned -0.042 -0.023 -0.117 -0.200** -0.504*** 0.300*** 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.091) (0.079) (0.119) (0.081)    
R&D propensity 0.334*** 0.238*** 0.185*** 0.253*** 0.168** 0.202*** 
 (0.063) (0.061) (0.069) (0.059) (0.072) (0.062)    
Share graduated employees -0.001 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002    
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)    
Competition intensity -0.021 0.007 0.033 -0.020 -0.035 -0.022    
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.020)    
Energy costs 0.116*** -0.008 -0.003 0.033 -0.010 0.070*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023)    
Gross tangible investments 0.098*** 0.059*** 0.051** 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.040**  
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.020)    
Epidemic effect* 3.318*** 3.433*** 4.627*** 2.443*** 4.428*** 2.659*** 
 (0.412) (0.479) (0.664) (0.350) (0.627) (0.464)    
Swiss firm -0.138* -0.056 -0.127* -0.206*** -0.067 -0.091    
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.081) (0.077)    
Austrian firm -0.166 -0.128 -0.183 -0.155 -0.091 -0.033    
 (0.102) (0.099) (0.120) (0.094) (0.127) (0.108)    
Constant -5.034*** -2.959*** -4.177*** -4.064*** -4.336*** -5.110*** 
 (0.503) (0.404) (0.459) (0.369) (0.581) (0.403)    
Note: multivariate probit estimator with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. *) the epidemic effect 
refers to the respective technology or the management systems. Number of observation 3480, Wald chi2 (294) 
= 4444.34***, Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho51 = rho61 = rho32 = rho42 = rho52 = rho62 
= rho43 = rho53 = rho63 = rho54 = rho64 = rho65 = 0: chi2(15) = 1493.89, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Table A1: Determinants for propensity and intensity per country 
 
 Propensity Intensity 
 CH D AT CH D AT 
       
Taxes -0.032 0.178*** -0.135    -0.110 -0.012 0.059    
 (0.072) (0.057) (0.172)    (0.127) (0.080) (0.270)    
Regulations 0.070 -0.041 -0.165    0.044 0.091 0.156    
 (0.069) (0.066) (0.190)    (0.115) (0.088) (0.248)    
Voluntary agreements 0.194*** 0.100 -0.360*   0.041 -0.004 -0.180    
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.190)    (0.109) (0.094) (0.251)    
Public subsidies 0.308*** 0.234*** 0.746*** -0.021 0.207*** 0.532*** 
 (0.065) (0.056) (0.148)    (0.097) (0.076) (0.188)    
Demand 0.251*** 0.102 0.332**  0.009 0.009 -0.213    
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.161)    (0.120) (0.095) (0.253)    
High/volatile energy prices 0.084 0.082 0.168    0.226** 0.176** -0.098    
 (0.065) (0.056) (0.167)    (0.113) (0.086) (0.275)    
Energy shortage -0.069 -0.091 -0.379**  -0.086 -0.061 -0.046    
 (0.071) (0.068) (0.177)    (0.118) (0.096) (0.225)    
Number of employees 0.131*** 0.073* -0.174    0.207* 0.249*** 0.419*** 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.135)    (0.106) (0.074) (0.148)    
Export 0.141 0.067 0.351    0.102 0.142 0.258    
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.272)    (0.161) (0.149) (0.519)    
Foreign owned -0.146 -0.116 -0.387*   0.250 0.352* 0.319    
 (0.097) (0.158) (0.231)    (0.181) (0.204) (0.366)    
R&D propensity 0.319*** 0.315*** 0.443**  -0.079 -0.179 0.079    
 (0.090) (0.083) (0.225)    (0.165) (0.136) (0.402)    
Share graduated empl. 0.003 -0.001 -0.005    -0.005 0.001 -0.014    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.003) (0.012)    
Competition intensity 0.036 -0.021 0.034    -0.002 -0.049 0.108    
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.077)    (0.050) (0.042) (0.106)    
Energy costs 0.032 0.037 0.111    0.180*** 0.165*** 0.264*** 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.100)    (0.069) (0.052) (0.090)    
Gross tangible investments 0.053* 0.070*** 0.280*** 0.545*** 0.445*** 0.164    
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.066)    (0.082) (0.047) (0.127)    
Epidemic adoption 3.037 -2.740 1.580       
 (1.860) (3.783) (2.576)       
Constant -4.222*** -1.288 -5.464*** 0.473 0.277 1.199    
 (0.612) (1.435) (1.036)    (0.922) (0.625) (1.465)    
       
N 1584 1633 300 600 845 176 
Wald chi2/R2 309.55*** 268.50*** 101.59*** 0.58 0.63 0.65 
Log Likelihood -894.73 -969.87 -138.46    -1091.56 -1529.57 -296.71    
